The Reconfigurable Ontology Project

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The Reconfigurable Ontology Project – *Series Overview*

This five-part philosophical series explores the conditions for recoverability in human existence, drawing on and expanding Heideggerian ontology. Through concepts like **reconfigurability**, **openness**, and the **drive-to-exist**, the essays examine how breakdown, deviation, and symbolic repair shape our capacity to persist.

Combining phenomenology, systems theory, and philosophical anthropology, the project proposes an ontology attuned to both finitude and the generativity of hope.

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Beyond Being-toward-Death Recoverability in Heidegger

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1. Introduction: Between Finitude and Hope

Existence has never been given as sheer stability. To live is always to unfold between the poles of generation and decay, emergence and dissolution. Human thought has long attempted to neutralize this polarity by privileging one side over the other: the permanence of Platonic forms over the flux of becoming, the perseverance of Spinoza's *conatus* over the threat of dissolution, or the inevitability of Schopenhauer's *Wille* over any possibility of renewal. Yet the interval between these poles—the fragile suspension that makes existence possible—remains undertheorized.

Heidegger's *Being and Time* marked a decisive break with earlier metaphysics by grounding ontology in finitude. His analysis of being-toward-death disclosed the structural fact that existence is bounded, fragile, and finite. This intervention remains one of the most rigorous accounts of human temporality, yet it leaves underdeveloped a crucial dimension: how beings reorganize once inherited frames collapse. In *Being and Time*, death sets the horizon of authenticity, but the dynamics of recoverability—how existence sustains itself through breakdown and renewal—are largely absent.

The present paper proposes the concept of the *drive-to-exist* to address this lacuna. Unlike instinct or volition, the drive-to-exist names a structural capacity by which beings persist not through equilibrium but through transformation. It reframes existence as an art of re-tuning, in which miscalibration and breakdown are not anomalies to be overcome but generative conditions that open the possibility of renewal.

In developing this claim, the paper proceeds in six steps. First, it clarifies why the drive-to-exist is both universal and indefinable: a condition disclosed through traces rather than a definable entity. Second, it elaborates a structural framework organized around reconfigurability, deviation, and reconstructivity. Third, it analyzes processual dynamics, showing how miscalibration leads to re-tuning and transformation across biological, cognitive, and social domains. Fourth, it reconceives hope not as an affective projection but as ontological openness, the lived correlate of the drive. Fifth, it explores the ethical and practical implications of this framework for ecological governance, institutional repair, and cultural resilience. Finally, it concludes by synthesizing these threads into an ontology of recoverability, supplementing Heidegger's finitude-centered analysis with the orientation of hope.

2. Universality and Indefinability of the Drive-to-Exist

The *drive-to-exist* can be observed across diverse domains of life and thought. At the biological level, it is reflected in the regenerative capacity of cells and the adaptive resilience of ecosystems. At the social level, it appears when institutions reorganize after crises, when legal frameworks are reconstituted in response to rupture, or when cultures recover after devastation. At the personal level, it surfaces in acts of survival, but also in the capacity to reorient meaning when inherited symbolic horizons collapse. These examples suggest a structural universality: the drive-to-exist names the dynamic by which persistence is achieved not through equilibrium but through transformation.

Yet this very universality entails a paradox: the more pervasive the phenomenon, the less it can be defined as an object. To define the drive as if it were a determinate entity would be to misrepresent its ontological status. Its operation is internal to existence itself, not external like an object of empirical description. In this respect, the drive-to-exist belongs to the lineage of what Kant called transcendental conditions: structures that make experience possible but are never themselves given as objects of experience. Similarly, Heidegger insisted that Being is not a being; it is disclosed only as the horizon within which beings appear. To demand a precise definition of the drive-to-exist would be to commit the same category mistake: it is not a discrete force among others but the dynamic that sustains the very possibility of continuity and renewal.

The implication is methodological. The drive-to-exist cannot be captured by direct definition but only through the *traces* it leaves in moments of disruption and re-tuning. Breakdown makes its presence visible: when inherited symbolic, temporal, or material frames collapse, the drive reveals itself in the capacity to reorganize. Its indefinability is thus not a weakness but a mark of ontological depth. Like life itself in biology, the drive cannot be pinned down to a single formula; it must be understood through the processes that disclose its activity.

Anticipating objections, one might argue that speaking of the drive-to-exist without strict definition risks vagueness or metaphor. Yet vagueness here is not conceptual indiscipline but ontological necessity. To insist on a closed definition would reduce the phenomenon to one of its partial manifestations—instinct, will, resilience—while missing the structural principle that unifies them. By affirming its indefinability, we preserve the openness appropriate to its status: a universal condition whose presence is glimpsed precisely in moments of rupture and renewal.

In this sense, the drive-to-exist resembles what Paul Ricoeur called a “second-order” concept: one that does not name a determinate thing but rather a structural mediation. It is not a metaphysical hypostasis but a phenomenological articulation of how existence is sustained through crisis. To exist is always to participate in this drive, even if it cannot be grasped as a definable entity. Universality and indefinability therefore belong together: the drive-to-exist is everywhere operative, and for that very reason it escapes objectification.

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3. Structural Framework: Reconfigurability, Deviation, Reconstructivity

If the *drive-to-exist* cannot be captured by definition, it can nevertheless be articulated structurally. The phenomenon of persistence-through-transformation can be clarified by distinguishing three inseparable moments: **reconfigurability**, **deviation**, and **reconstructivity**. These are not stages that occur sequentially, but structural dimensions that together constitute the dynamic of existence.

Reconfigurability names the latent flexibility of being. To exist is not to be fixed once and for all but to remain open to rearrangement. Even the most stable forms—crystalline structures, biological organisms, or institutional frameworks—carry within them a capacity for variation. This flexibility is not accidental but constitutive: without it, beings would collapse at the first sign of disruption. Reconfigurability provides the underlying condition that makes both breakdown and renewal possible.

Deviation designates the structural possibility of rupture. No form of life, no symbolic system, and no institution persists without fissures. Deviation does not merely threaten stability from outside; it belongs to existence as such. The possibility of disalignment—between organism and environment, between individual and collective, between symbolic horizon and lived reality—marks the fragility of being. In Heideggerian terms, this corresponds to the “not-at-home” character of Dasein, the ever-present possibility of breakdown. In the framework proposed here, deviation is not an anomaly but the activation of reconfigurability: the point at which flexibility is forced into manifestation.

Reconstructivity refers to the capacity of existence to reorganize after rupture. It does not imply a simple return to the previous state but the emergence of a new configuration. Biological regeneration, institutional reform, and cultural renaissance illustrate this dimension. Reconstructivity reveals that deviation need not collapse into negation; rather, rupture opens the very possibility of renewal. Through

reconstructivity, the drive-to-exist discloses itself not as blind repetition but as transformative resilience.

This triadic account finds resonance in the history of philosophy. **Spinoza** highlighted the persistence of beings through *conatus*, but his framework privileges stability and lacks an account of structural rupture. **Schopenhauer**, by contrast, radicalized disruption through the blind *Wille*, yet conceived it only as futility without the prospect of renewal. **Nietzsche** valorized becoming and self-overcoming, approaching reconstructivity, but without fully clarifying the structural conditions of rupture and flexibility. **Kierkegaard** emphasized despair as the breakdown of the self and faith as its recovery, offering an existential articulation of deviation and reconstructivity but not their ontological grounding. Each thinker captured a fragment of the triad, but only in isolation.

The present framework integrates these fragments into a systematic ontology. Reconfigurability corresponds to Spinoza's persistence, deviation to Schopenhauer's rupture, reconstructivity to Nietzsche's renewal, while Kierkegaard's dialectic illustrates the existential experience of the whole dynamic. Taken together, they disclose that existence is not simply a matter of surviving against decay but of sustaining itself through openness to change.

The triadic model therefore redefines finitude. To be finite is not merely to approach death but to live within the tension of flexibility, rupture, and renewal. Death still marks the ultimate limit, as Heidegger emphasized, but finitude is not exhausted by this closure. It is also the very condition that allows beings to reconfigure themselves after collapse. In this light, the drive-to-exist can be understood not as a blind compulsion but as the structural dynamic of recoverability: the ontological capacity to persist through transformation.

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4. Processual Dynamics: Breakdown and Re-Tuning

If the structural triad clarifies the dimensions of the *drive-to-exist*, it remains necessary to describe how these dimensions unfold in lived processes. Existence is not only flexible, rupturable, and renewable in the abstract; it is continually enacted as the negotiation of breakdown and re-tuning. This chapter develops a processual model in which disruption is not simply a threat to stability but the generative condition of transformation.

Miscalibration provides a useful term for designating the moment when established frames—temporal, symbolic, or social—no longer fit lived reality. At the personal level, miscalibration occurs when expectations collapse, as in grief, failure, or sudden loss. At the institutional level, it arises when legal or economic systems no longer match ecological or social demands. At the cultural level, miscalibration manifests when symbolic repertoires cease to resonate, leaving communities without orienting narratives. In each case, the breakdown of alignment is not merely accidental but structurally inscribed. It discloses the ever-present possibility of deviation that belongs to finite existence.

Yet miscalibration need not end in paralysis. Precisely because beings are reconfigurable, breakdown can activate processes of re-tuning. This can be seen in multiple scientific and cultural registers. **Ilya Prigogine's** work on dissipative structures demonstrates that physical systems reorganize into new forms when driven far from equilibrium: instability becomes the site of new order. **Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela's** theory of autopoiesis depicts living systems not as static machines but as organizations that persist by regenerating their own components. **Michael Tomasello's** anthropology of shared intentionality shows how human communities recalibrate symbolic frames to restore coordination when previous patterns fail. **Thomas Kuhn's** analysis of paradigm shifts highlights how scientific communities reorganize under the pressure of anomalies, transforming breakdown into epistemic innovation. These examples converge on a single insight: deviation is not only destructive but constitutive of renewal.

The process model may thus be schematized as a cycle: **breakdown** (miscalibration of inherited frames) → **re-tuning** (activation of reconfigurability through adaptive response) → **transformation** (emergence of new configuration). Importantly, this cycle is not linear but recursive: each new configuration carries within it the seeds of future miscalibration, ensuring that existence is always provisional and open-ended.

What this model makes explicit is that recoverability is not an accident but a constitutive feature of existence. Heidegger emphasized that being-toward-death discloses the ultimate horizon of finitude. The present framework supplements this by showing that finitude also discloses the structural necessity of re-tuning: beings are not only destined to end but structurally compelled to reorganize in the face of instability. In this sense, the *drive-to-exist* is the ontological name for the process by which life, institutions, and cultures persist through cycles of breakdown and renewal.

By foregrounding processual dynamics, we avoid treating hope as mere psychological consolation. Instead, hope can now be seen as the lived orientation toward the possibility of re-tuning. It is to this ontological conception of hope that the next chapter turns.

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5. Hope as Ontological Openness

Hope is often conflated with optimism. Optimism projects a probable success: it depends on favorable odds, on the anticipation that future outcomes will likely align with present desires. Hope, by contrast, persists even where probability fails. It does not calculate likelihoods but discloses an openness to what cannot be guaranteed. In this sense, hope is not reducible to an affective state or a psychological disposition; it is the existential posture that corresponds to the *drive-to-exist*. It is the phenomenological correlate of re-tuning, the orientation that sustains beings in the face of breakdown.

This distinction has a long philosophical lineage. **Ernst Bloch** described hope as the "Not-Yet," the surplus of possibility that exceeds the present order of things. **Gabriel Marcel** emphasized fidelity and trust, a steadfast openness that endures even when concrete outcomes are absent. **Paul Ricoeur** articulated hope as a surplus of capability, the sense that human beings are always more than their failures disclose. **Jonathan Lear** developed the idea of "radical hope," the stance that allows communities to reconfigure meaning even after cultural devastation. Each of these accounts converges on the idea that hope is not reducible to optimism or positive affect but names a structural openness to renewal.

The framework of the drive-to-exist clarifies this convergence. If existence is constituted by reconfigurability, deviation, and reconstructivity, then hope is the lived stance that allows this structure to be inhabited without collapse into despair. Hope is not the denial of deviation but its acknowledgment as the condition for renewal. It is not the fantasy of avoiding rupture but the courage to remain open within it. In this way, hope transforms breakdown from sheer negation into the possibility of re-tuning.

A conceptual table may help illustrate the difference. Optimism is oriented toward probability, has a narrow temporal horizon, and functions as an affective state. Hope, by contrast, is oriented toward unrealized possibilities, has an emergent and indeterminate horizon, and functions as structural openness. Whereas optimism falters when probabilities collapse, hope persists precisely where guarantees are absent.

Hope thus operates at multiple levels. **Individually**, it enables the self to remain open to reorientation even when despair threatens closure. **Collectively**, it sustains communities as they face institutional collapse, ecological devastation, or cultural breakdown. Hope is not only the resilience of the individual psyche but the infrastructure of shared worlds: it is what allows symbolic repertoires, normative frameworks, and communal bonds to remain open to reconfiguration.

In this light, hope emerges as the ontological posture that prevents the drive-to-exist from degenerating into blind compulsion. It is the interpretive and existential openness that makes re-tuning possible. Hope, therefore, is not an optional sentiment but the essential correlate of recoverability itself. Without it, the drive would collapse into mechanical repetition; with it, existence can inhabit finitude as a space of transformation.

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6. Ethical and Practical Implications

If hope is ontological openness, then ethics must be rethought in terms of recoverability rather than stability. Classical ethics often aimed at establishing firm principles or securing unshakable foundations. Yet if existence itself is constituted by breakdown and re-tuning, then ethical life cannot be reduced to the maintenance of fixed norms. It must instead cultivate the conditions that allow renewal to occur. The task of ethics is less to prevent rupture absolutely than to orient the processes of reconstruction that follow it.

Three principles emerge from this reorientation. The first is **resilience**: the ethical capacity to remain attuned to reconfigurability, to accept fragility without collapsing into despair. Resilience is not mere endurance; it is the willingness to inhabit disruption as a potential site of transformation. The second is **responsibility**: the obligation to guide reconstructivity in ways that sustain shared life rather than exacerbate destruction. Because breakdown always opens multiple possible paths, responsibility consists in discerning and directing renewal toward just and sustainable forms. The third is **community**: the recognition that recoverability is not an individual affair alone but a shared process. Hope is most fully realized in collective contexts, where mutual recognition and collaboration sustain the openness required for re-tuning.

These principles have concrete implications across domains. In **ecological governance**, they suggest that sustainability must be reconceived as adaptability: systems should be designed not for static equilibrium but for the capacity to reorganize across mismatched

timescales. Research in resilience theory confirms that ecological and social-ecological systems survive not by avoiding disruption but by transforming through it. In **institutional life**, this orientation implies that crises are not simply threats but opportunities for reconfiguration. As Sheila Jasanoff has argued, public reason and democratic deliberation must be capable of renegotiating norms under conditions of uncertainty. In **cultural contexts**, the principle of community underscores the importance of recognition: as Axel Honneth has shown, the repair of social bonds depends not on restoring the past intact but on reconstructing patterns of respect and solidarity that make renewal possible.

Illustrative cases can further clarify these implications. Climate change governance exemplifies the need for resilience and responsibility: societies must learn to reconfigure infrastructures, economies, and norms under unprecedented pressures. The COVID-19 pandemic revealed how institutions must recalibrate rapidly in response to systemic miscalibration, and how failures of recognition can fracture communities. Historical examples of cultural renaissance after collapse—whether the recovery of Europe after the Second World War or the revitalization of Indigenous traditions in the wake of colonial devastation—demonstrate that reconstructivity is not merely theoretical but a lived necessity.

Ethics, then, is not primarily the imposition of stability but the cultivation of openness. To act ethically is to sustain the possibility of re-tuning, to preserve the conditions under which breakdown can become generative rather than destructive. This orientation reframes responsibility not as the enforcement of fixed norms but as the continual guidance of renewal within finitude. Hope, understood ontologically, thus becomes the infrastructure of ethical life: it is the condition that enables resilience, responsibility, and community to remain operative within the perpetual cycles of breakdown and transformation that constitute existence.

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7. Conclusion: Toward an Ontology of Recoverability

This paper has argued that existence cannot be understood in terms of sheer stability but only through the dynamic of breakdown and renewal. The *drive-to-exist* was introduced as a universal yet indefinable structure that underlies this dynamic, disclosed not as a definable entity but as a condition glimpsed in moments of disruption and re-tuning. Through the structural framework of reconfigurability, deviation, and reconstructivity, the drive-to-exist was clarified as a triadic ontology that integrates

fragments of earlier philosophies while avoiding their partiality. By further developing a processual model of miscalibration and re-tuning, the analysis showed how recoverability is enacted across biological, institutional, and cultural domains.

Within this framework, hope emerged as the phenomenological correlate of the drive-to-exist. Unlike optimism, which depends on probabilities and outcomes, hope was reconceived as ontological openness: the existential stance that allows beings to inhabit finitude without collapsing into despair. It is hope that prevents breakdown from degenerating into paralysis and that makes reconstructivity more than blind repetition. In this sense, hope is not merely an emotion but an ontological condition, the lived orientation that sustains persistence-through-transformation.

The ethical implications of this framework were articulated in terms of resilience, responsibility, and community. Ethical life was redefined not as the preservation of stability but as the cultivation of openness: the capacity to orient reconstruction in ways that sustain shared worlds. Practical examples from ecological governance, institutional repair, and cultural renaissance confirmed that recoverability is not only a philosophical abstraction but a lived necessity.

The contribution of this study is twofold. Philosophically, it supplements Heidegger's analysis of being-toward-death with an ontology of recoverability, showing that finitude is not only a limit but also a condition of renewal. Practically, it reframes resilience and hope as ontological categories, offering resources for interdisciplinary dialogue between philosophy, science, and ethics.

Future work remains necessary on several fronts. Empirically, further studies could investigate how communities enact re-tuning under crisis, offering concrete illustrations of the drive-to-exist. Theoretically, formal models of recovery domains and thresholds may clarify the dynamics of reconstructivity. Normatively, criteria are needed to distinguish constructive re-tuning from destructive forms of adaptation. Such developments would not only refine the ontology proposed here but also test its relevance across disciplines.

To conclude: to exist is not merely to endure until death, nor to cling to equilibrium. It is to persist through transformation, to remain structurally open to renewal within finitude. The *drive-to-exist* names this dynamic, and hope names the stance that allows it to be inhabited. Together they disclose an ontology of recoverability—an ontology in which death remains the horizon, but hope becomes the condition that sustains life's capacity for reconfiguration.

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Heidegger and the Drive-to-Exist - From Finitude to Hope

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1. Introduction: Between Generation and Decay

Existence unfolds not in equilibrium but within the fragile interval between generation and decay. To exist is to emerge, persist, and dissolve—always suspended between continuity and rupture. This polarity is constitutive: beings become what they are only through the tension of becoming and perishing.

Philosophical traditions have repeatedly sought to resolve this tension by privileging one pole. From Plato's eternal forms to Spinoza's *conatus* and Schopenhauer's *Wille*, existence has often been reduced either to the persistence of being or the inevitability of dissolution. Heidegger's *Being and Time* marked a decisive break by grounding ontology in *being-toward-death*, revealing finitude as the horizon of existence.^1 Yet even this transformative framework leaves underdeveloped a crucial question: **How do beings reorganize themselves when inherited frames collapse?**

1.1 The Problem: Recoverability within Finitude

Persistence-oriented accounts, such as Spinoza's *conatus*, Freud's drives, or modern resilience theory, emphasize stability and continuity. Heidegger, by contrast, illuminates mortality but underplays recoverability—the ways in which beings recalibrate when breakdown occurs.

This paper therefore introduces the concept of the *drive-to-exist*: a structural capacity enabling systems to sustain and re-tune their organization when symbolic, temporal, or material frames fail. Unlike instinct or volition, the drive-to-exist names a deeper ontological dynamic: persistence-through-transformation, not simply resistance to disruption.

1.2 Beyond Dualisms: From Breakdown to Renewal

A central claim of this paper is that breakdown is not pathological deviation but generative condition of existence. From Ilya Prigogine's theory of dissipative structures^2 to Michael Tomasello's analysis of shared intentionality,^3 across domains we find that miscalibration—moments when inherited patterns fail—is precisely where new forms of organization become possible.

This reframes existence as practice rather than state:

- **Miscalibration** exposes contingency of inherited frames.
- **Re-tuning** reorganizes symbolic, temporal, and relational structures.
- **Hope** sustains openness to unrealized possibilities.

- The *drive-to-exist* integrates these dynamics into persistence-through-transformation.

1.3 Contribution of This Paper

The paper advances three claims:

1. **Theoretical innovation**: introduces *drive-to-exist* as an ontological framework unifying persistence and transformation.
2. **Processual model**: develops re-tuning and miscalibration as mechanisms of recoverability, grounded in phenomenology, thermodynamics, and cognitive science.
3. **Normative implications**: reinterprets hope as a structural resource, showing its relevance for ethical and institutional decision-making under uncertainty.

1.4 Outline of the Argument

- **Chapter 2** defines the *drive-to-exist*, distinguishing it from instinct, volition, homeostasis, and resilience.
- **Chapter 3** develops a process model of re-tuning, analyzing how beings recalibrate frames under breakdown.
- **Chapter 4** reconceptualizes hope as ontological openness, drawing from Heidegger, Bloch, Kierkegaard, Marcel, Ricoeur, and Lear.
- **Chapter 5** integrates these threads into a synthesis, highlighting implications for ecological governance, algorithmic systems, and institutional repair.

Notes

1. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962).
2. Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers, *Order Out of Chaos* (New York: Bantam, 1984).
3. Michael Tomasello, *A Natural History of Human Thinking* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014).

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2. Defining the Drive-to-Exist

The *drive-to-exist* seeks to articulate a structural dynamic that transcends both biological instinct and conscious volition. To exist, on this account, is to participate in patterns of organization that are neither wholly determined nor entirely arbitrary. Beings sustain

themselves, adapt, and reorganize in response to perturbation, but the logic of this process cannot be reduced to any single framework—whether evolutionary biology, phenomenology, or cognitive science. The *drive-to-exist* thus describes an ontological condition: the capacity of systems to maintain and recalibrate their existence under instability.

2.1 Beyond Instinct and Will

Classical theories of drive—ranging from Freud's *Todestrieb* to Schopenhauer's *Wille*—illuminate compulsion and persistence, yet they remain insufficient for systems capable of re-tuning themselves within breakdown.^1 The *drive-to-exist* does not imply a teleological endpoint (death, pleasure, equilibrium). Instead, it names the **structural openness to renewal**. Instinct explains survival; volition explains choice; neither explains how patterns reorganize when frames collapse.

2.2 Self-Organization and Pattern Formation

Ilya Prigogine's work on dissipative structures shows that far-from-equilibrium systems do not simply decay into disorder; under certain conditions, perturbations drive reorganization at higher levels of complexity.^2 Similarly, the concept of autopoiesis (Maturana & Varela) conceptualizes living systems as organizationally closed yet structurally open: identity is maintained not by resisting change but by regenerating the patterns that define it.^3

The *drive-to-exist* thus reframes persistence: not resistance to entropy, but **inhabiting instability**.

2.3 Temporal Frames and Symbolic References

In human life, the *drive* is mediated by symbolic and temporal frames—structures through which agents coordinate meaning, identity, and action. Research in cognitive anthropology (Tomasello) highlights the role of shared intentionality in constructing collective reference frames.^4 When frames misalign—when agents operate within incompatible symbolic or temporal horizons—existence becomes precarious. Yet such breakdowns also open the possibility of re-tuning.

2.4 Miscalibration as a Site of Transformation

A system is miscalibrated when its patterns no longer mediate between internal states and external conditions. Miscalibration is not mere failure; it signals the need for re-tuning. Ecological disruption can induce adaptive strategies; institutional crises can catalyze normative

renegotiation. In both cases, the *drive-to-exist* operates as the capacity for **self-reorganization under destabilization**.

2.5 Toward a Relational Ontology

Integrating insights from thermodynamics, cognitive science, and phenomenology, the *drive-to-exist* reframes ontology as relational rather than essentialist. Existence arises from continuous recalibration within dynamic environments. The *drive* does not oppose Heidegger's *being-toward-death* but complements it: finitude discloses limits; the drive highlights renewal within those limits.

2.6 Operationalizing the Drive-to-Exist

2.6.1 One-Sentence Definition

Drive-to-exist = the structural capacity of a system to sustain and recalibrate its patterns of organization when symbolic, temporal, or material reference frames collapse, while maintaining openness to unrealized possibilities.

Constitutive conditions:

1. **Structural capacity** (domain-transcending).
2. **Recalibration** (beyond mere persistence).
3. **Openness** (link to ontological hope).

2.6.2 Differentiation from Existing Frameworks

Concept	Definition	Focus	Recoverability	Re-tuning	Role of Hope
Spinoza: *Conatus*	Will to persist	Continuity	High	None	Absent
Schopenhauer: *Wille*	Blind striving	Compulsion	Low	None	Absent
Homeostasis	Maintaining equilibrium	Stability	High (bounded)	Limited	Absent
Resilience (Holling)	Recovery after disturbance	Return to baseline	Medium–High	Partial	Absent
Drive-to-exist	Self-reorganization under collapse	Renewal-in-limits	High	Essential	Central

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2.6.3 Multi-Layer Framework: Where the Drive Applies

Layer	System Examples	Form of Drive	Mechanism of Re-tuning	Relation to Hope
Physical	Dissipative structures	Pattern-maintenance	Energy flows, entropy gradients	Minimal
Biological	Cells, ecosystems	Adaptive drive	Genetic adaptation, feedback	Implicit
Cognitive	Individual agents	Intentional drive	Metacognition, frame repair	Moderate
Social	Institutions, cultures	Collective drive	Norm renegotiation, reframing	Strong

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2.6.4 Visual Model: Recovery Domain and Threshold



- **Hope Zone**: range where re-tuning sustains viability.
- **Collapse Zone**: beyond threshold θ, where recalibration fails.

2.6.5 Exclusion Criteria (What the Drive Is Not)

- **Mere persistence**: lacks recalibration.
- **Blind compulsion** (*Wille*): no frame reconstruction.
- **Simple resilience**: return to prior state only.
- **Deterministic equilibrium**: no accommodation of novelty.

2.6.6 Implications

Operationalization clarifies distinctions from adjacent concepts, grounds cross-domain application, and links intrinsically to hope. It also provides a basis for empirical modeling via recovery domains and thresholds.

Notes

1. Arthur Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Representation*, trans. E. F. J. Payne (New York: Dover, 1969).
2. Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers, *Order Out of Chaos* (New York: Bantam, 1984).
3. Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela, *Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realization of the Living* (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1980).
4. Michael Tomasello, *A Natural History of Human Thinking* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014).

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3. Re-tuning and Miscalibration

If the *drive-to-exist* names the structural capacity to sustain and reorganize patterns, **re-tuning** designates the process by which this occurs. Re-tuning refers to the ongoing adjustment of temporal frames, symbolic references, and relational commitments that enable coordination. It is typically initiated by **miscalibration**—moments when inherited structures no longer mediate between internal states and external conditions.

This chapter examines re-tuning across temporal, symbolic, and intersubjective dimensions, showing that miscalibration is not merely disruptive but generative of transformation.

3.1 Temporal Frames: Negotiating Horizons of Action

Every act of coordination presupposes a temporal frame within which past, present, and future are ordered. Miscalibration frequently arises from mismatches in horizons: climate systems unfold over centuries, while governance operates on electoral cycles. Interpersonal conflict similarly emerges when rhythms of urgency diverge.

Re-tuning here entails:

- **Realigning temporal expectations** (shifting urgency thresholds).
- **Redefining horizons of relevance** (what counts as a “future” worth acting upon).
- **Negotiating overlapping timescales** (short-term pragmatics vs. long-term sustainability).

Without re-tuning, agents remain trapped in temporal incommensurability.

3.2 Symbolic References: Constructing Shared Worlds

Symbolic frames establish meaning, identity, and norms. They are historically contingent, intersubjectively maintained, and open to contestation. Miscalibration occurs when symbolic references fracture—when inherited categories no longer align with lived experience.

Re-tuning is not mere consensus-building. It involves **creative construction of new shared references**:

- Redefining terms and metaphors.
- Shifting legitimacy criteria.
- Generating alternative symbolic repertoires.

Paradigm shifts in science, normative renegotiations in law, or cultural redefinitions in art exemplify symbolic re-tuning.^1

3.3 Recognition and Agreement: The Social Dynamics of Re-tuning

Because symbolic and temporal frames are sustained intersubjectively, re-tuning requires **recognition**—acknowledging others as co-authors of shared worlds. Miscalibration in recognition manifests as distrust, exclusion, or breakdown of dialogue.

Re-tuning demands:

- Repairing recognition relations.
- Sustaining **meta-coordination**: the shared commitment to keep negotiating frames even amid disagreement.
- Treating conflict not as anomaly but as constitutive of shared existence.

Axel Honneth’s theory of recognition underscores that failures of recognition are both epistemic and ethical, requiring transformation rather than mere restoration.^2

3.4 Breakdown and Creativity

Miscalibration can be **productive**. When patterns fail, contingency becomes visible, and conceptual as well as experiential space opens for novelty. This dynamic is evident in:

- **Ecological disruption** → emergence of adaptive strategies.^3
- **Institutional crises** → normative renegotiation and reform.^4

- **Scientific anomalies** → revolutionary paradigm shifts (Kuhn).^5

Thus breakdown is not an accidental disturbance but a structural condition that enables transformation.

3.5 Re-tuning as Ontological Practice

At its deepest level, re-tuning reveals that existence is practiced rather than given. Persistence is not equilibrium but the **capacity for ongoing recalibration**. Miscalibration is therefore not deviation but constitutive of being.

The *drive-to-exist* expresses itself not in maintaining fixed stability but in sustaining intelligibility across shifting frames. To exist is to inhabit a world that is always in negotiation —a **dynamic art of re-tuning**.

Notes

1. Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970).
2. Axel Honneth, *The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts*, trans. Joel Anderson (Cambridge: Polity, 1995).
3. Carl Folke et al., “Adaptive Governance of Social-Ecological Systems,” *Annual Review of Environment and Resources* 30, no. 1 (2005): 441–73.
4. Sheila Jasanoff, *Science and Public Reason* (New York: Routledge, 2012).
5. Kuhn, *Scientific Revolutions*.

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4. Hope as Ontological Openness

4.0 From Affect to Ontology

Hope is often reduced to optimism or subjective affect. Within modern epistemology, it is assimilated into expectation, probability, or motivational resource. Yet such renderings obscure a deeper ontological dimension.

I argue that hope is best understood as a **structural openness of existence itself**. Heidegger’s analysis of *being-toward-death* discloses finitude, but it leaves underdeveloped how beings remain engaged once horizons collapse. The *drive-to-exist* addresses this gap by naming the capacity for re-tuning under breakdown. Hope is its correlate: the orientation that sustains openness within finitude.^1

4.1 Distinguishing Hope from Optimism

Optimism presupposes probability and favorable outcomes; hope persists without guarantees.

Aspect	Optimism	Hope (this account)
Orientation	Toward probable success	Toward unrealized possibilities
Temporal horizon	Predictive, narrow	Emergent, indeterminate
Ontological status	Subjective affect	Structural mode of being

This distinction resonates with Kierkegaard, for whom despair arises when finite beings refuse their openness to the infinite.^2 Hope, therefore, is not prediction but existential readiness to inhabit uncertainty.

4.2 Intellectual Lineages of Hope

This structural reinterpretation draws upon multiple traditions:

- **Ernst Bloch** conceived hope as orientation to the “Not-Yet,” an ontological surplus irreducible to present actuality.^3
- **Gabriel Marcel** described hope as fidelity, a “being-in-hope” grounded in trust rather than calculation.^4
- **Paul Ricoeur** emphasized the surplus of capability—humans as capable of more than actualized roles.^5
- **Jonathan Lear** analyzed cultural devastation, arguing that hope sustains meaning when inherited frameworks collapse.^6

These perspectives converge in affirming that hope is not an ancillary emotion but a **condition of renewal under rupture**.

4.3 Hope, Miscalibration, and the Drive-to-Exist

Miscalibration exposes the fragility of symbolic, temporal, and relational frames. Without hope, such exposure yields paralysis; with hope, contingency becomes generative.

- Without hope: collapse → paralysis.
- With hope: collapse → recognition of contingency → re-tuning → transformation.

Thus hope is the **structural orientation** that prevents the *drive-to-exist* from devolving into blind compulsion, while the drive prevents hope from dissolving into idle sentiment.

4.4 Collective Hope

Hope acquires its ontological force most clearly at the collective level. **Collective hope** can be defined as the distributed capacity of communities to sustain openness by renegotiating shared horizons and reference frames.

Key features:

- **Distributed**: no single bearer of hope.
- **Intersubjective**: requires recognition of others.
- **Generative**: enables novelty, not mere restoration.

Illustrations include ecological governance across mismatched timescales,^7 adaptive institutions that recalibrate when predictive models fail, and practices of solidarity during systemic crisis. In such contexts, hope functions not as affect but as **infrastructure**.

4.5 Toward an Ontology of Openness

Hope integrates the dual modalities of the *drive-to-exist*:

1. **Self-maintenance**—preserving organization across disruption.
2. **Self-transcendence**—reorganizing when inherited frames collapse.

Ontologically, hope articulates the openness disclosed by finitude. Ethically, it grounds responsibility to remain in dialogue amid uncertainty. Epistemically, it demands humility in the face of instability.

4.6 Hope as Practice

If hope is ontological, it must also be cultivated. Institutions, discourses, and collective rituals either sustain or erode the conditions of hope. To **practice hope** is to design structures that remain open to re-tuning: adaptive governance, deliberative forums, and epistemic communities committed to renegotiation.

Hope, thus practiced, becomes the **infrastructure of recoverability**—treating breakdown not as deviation but as generative condition of renewal.

Notes

1. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962).

2. Søren Kierkegaard, *The Sickness unto Death*, trans. Alastair Hannay (London: Penguin, 1989).
3. Ernst Bloch, *The Principle of Hope*, trans. Neville Plaice, Stephen Plaice, and Paul Knight (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995).
4. Gabriel Marcel, *Homo Viator: Introduction to a Metaphysic of Hope* (London: Harper & Brothers, 1951).
5. Paul Ricoeur, *Oneself as Another*, trans. Kathleen Blamey (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).
6. Jonathan Lear, *Radical Hope: Ethics in the Face of Cultural Devastation* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006).
7. Carl Folke et al., "Adaptive Governance of Social-Ecological Systems," *Annual Review of Environment and Resources* 30, no. 1 (2005): 441–73.

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5. Conclusion: Ontological Stakes of the Drive-to-Exist

This paper has articulated the *drive-to-exist* as a framework for rethinking existence not as equilibrium but as recoverability. Miscalibration is not an accidental disturbance but the generative site of reorganization. The *drive-to-exist* captures this paradox: to exist is to inhabit a zone of dynamic recalibration, sustaining worlds while remaining open to their transformation.

5.1 Ontological Dynamics

Across biological, ecological, cognitive, and social domains, persistence depends upon a dual capacity:

1. **Self-maintenance**—preserving patterns through disruption.
2. **Self-transcendence**—reorganizing when inherited frames collapse.

Existence is therefore not static endurance but a dynamic openness to transformation, embedded in the very structure of being.

5.2 Re-tuning as the Modality of Persistence

Temporal frames, symbolic references, and recognition relations form the scaffolding of shared worlds. Yet they remain fragile and prone to collapse. **Re-tuning** names the creative negotiation by which such worlds are recomposed. It is the lived modality of persistence-through-transformation.

5.3 Hope as Ontological Openness

Hope has been reconceptualized here not as affective optimism but as **structural openness**—the orientation that sustains possibility when neither stability nor success is guaranteed. Hope integrates maintenance with transcendence, explaining why breakdown can be generative rather than terminal.

5.4 Ethical and Epistemic Implications

- **Ontological**: Stability is not default but achievement; existence is contingent and revisable.
- **Epistemic**: Knowledge must remain responsive to breakdown, cultivating humility before irreducible uncertainty.^1
- **Ethical**: To sustain shared worlds requires commitments to remain in negotiation, inhabiting uncertainty without foreclosing futures.

5.5 Future Directions

The framework of the *drive-to-exist* opens pathways for empirical and normative research:

- **Empirical**: longitudinal studies of re-tuning in institutions; simulations of recovery domains and thresholds.
- **Normative**: designing infrastructures of hope, from adaptive governance to deliberative democracy.
- **Philosophical**: criteria for distinguishing constructive from destructive re-tuning.

5.6 Integrative Synthesis: Drive, Hope, and Transformation

Schematic:

Breakdown / Miscalibration
↓
Drive-to-Exist (capacity)
↓ requires
Hope (ontological openness)
↓ enables
Re-tuning (reconfiguration of frames)
↓ yields
Transformation (novel forms of life & meaning)

The *drive* provides capacity; hope sustains orientation; together they unlock re-tuning, where transformation becomes possible.

5.7 Closing Reflection

To exist is not merely to persist; it is to remain structurally open to what exceeds one's inherited frames. The *drive-to-exist* expresses this capacity for transformation, while hope sustains the orientation toward unrealized possibilities. Together, they reveal existence as an iterative practice of renewal—most urgent precisely where predictive control fails.

Notes

1. Sheila Jasanoff, *Science and Public Reason* (New York: Routledge, 2012).

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Heidegger and the Reconfigurable Ontology of Hope

Abstract

This paper develops a reconfiguration of Heideggerian ontology by introducing a triadic framework of **Reconfigurability, Possibility of Deviation, and Reconstructivity**. The argument begins with the observation that philosophy has long privileged the binary of generation and decay, leaving under-theorized the unstable dynamics that occur in between. Heidegger's *Being and Time* decisively disclosed finitude through the analysis of being-toward-death, yet it left insufficiently articulated the structural processes of rupture and recovery. Later Heideggeran concepts such as *Ereignis* and *Gelassenheit* gestured toward openness but still lacked a systematic account of deviation and renewal.

The proposed model supplements this lacuna by defining existence as structurally flexible (reconfigurability), inherently disruptible (possibility of deviation), and intrinsically renewable (reconstructivity). In comparative perspective, this framework integrates what earlier ontologies emphasized only partially: Spinoza's persistence, Schopenhauer's rupture, and Nietzsche's affirmation of becoming. Each captured a dimension of existence, but only in isolation. The triadic account articulates their structural interrelation and provides a systematic ontology of disruption and renewal.

The ethical implications culminate in a redefinition of **hope**. Rather than a psychological affect or mere optimism, hope is here understood as the structural openness of finite being to renewal after rupture. This ontology of hope positions finitude not as a closed limit but as the very ground where reconfiguration becomes possible. In doing so, the paper offers a novel supplement to Heidegger's finitude-centered ontology and an ontological grounding for hope as resilience, responsibility, and community.

Keywords

- Heidegger
- Ontology
- Finitude
- Reconfigurability

- Deviation and Reconstructivity
- Hope

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1. Introduction

Metaphors of flow and movement have recurred throughout the history of philosophy. From Heraclitus's river to Nietzsche's becoming,^1 such motifs have repeatedly served as heuristics for grasping existence in its dynamic character. The "vortex" image employed in this paper belongs to this lineage. Here, however, it is used only as an intuitive introduction, before being analytically reformulated as follows.

Existence unfolds like a vortex, dispersing outward and expanding the margin of deviation. This outward movement is moderated by interference with other currents, which may restrain the speed of deviation and enable retention or reconstruction. Yet when interference accumulates excessively, existence is strained and eventually dissipates. This image illustrates the dual character of existence as at once deviative and interfering.

Philosophy, however, has long reduced this duality to a binary opposition between generation and decay. Generation has typically been valorized as positive, while decay has been regarded as negative, with one pole privileged at the expense of the other. What has remained underdeveloped is the unstable dynamic that arises in between—the processes of deviation and recovery that constitute the interval between emergence and dissolution. The central task of this paper is to describe this "between" as a distinct ontological mode.

This metaphorical image can be analytically reformulated into three conceptual elements: **Reconfigurability**, **Possibility of Deviation**, and **Reconstructivity**. On this basis, the present paper proposes a reconfiguration of Heideggerian ontology, seeking to articulate a conception of existence that accounts for both finitude and the possibility of hope.

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2. Revisiting Heidegger

2.1 Being-toward-death in *Being and Time*

Heidegger's *Being and Time* defined existence as *Sein-zum-Tode* (being-toward-death), thereby placing finitude at the center of ontology.^2 Death discloses Dasein's *eigentlichste Möglichkeit* (ownmost possibility), functioning as the horizon in which existence appropriates itself. This move decisively shifted ontology away from mere biological persistence and toward an understanding of being as essentially finite—a turn that had a profound impact on twentieth-century philosophy.^3 Yet this framework privileges death as the terminal rupture while leaving underdeveloped the subsequent dynamics of reassembly and renewal. Existence may reveal its finitude through death, but how such disclosure opens toward further possibilities, or recalibrates relations to the everyday world, remains unclear.

2.2 Later Heidegger: *Ereignis* and *Gelassenheit*

In his later thought, Heidegger introduced the notions of *Ereignis* (event of appropriation) and *Gelassenheit* (releasement) as attempts to rethink existence in more generative and open terms.^4 *Ereignis* points to the event-character of being, while *Gelassenheit* emphasizes a receptive attitude toward what comes to presence. Both can be seen as efforts to soften the mortality-centered emphasis of *Being and Time* and to highlight the openness of existence.^5
Nevertheless, the interplay of deviation and recovery was not systematically developed. *Ereignis* designates a higher-order structure—the happening of being itself—but does not clarify how breakdown concretely occurs or how new configurations emerge. Likewise, *Gelassenheit* stresses letting-be but leaves unexplained how releasement might lead to retuning or reconstruction in practice.^6

2.3 Toward a Reconfiguration

It is precisely in this lacuna that the present framework seeks to supplement and reconfigure Heidegger's ontology. Existence may be understood as grounded in **Reconfigurability**, the latent flexibility of being, which is activated through a **Possibility of Deviation**, and expressed through **Reconstructivity**, the movement of reassembly. This triadic framework allows death to remain a disclosure of finitude, but repositions it not as a mere endpoint, but as a trigger for processes of deviation, recovery, and renewal. In this way, finitude becomes not only a limit but also the ontological ground of hope.

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3. Reconfigurability, Deviation, and Reconstructivity

3.1 Reconfigurability: Structural Flexibility

Existence is constituted not by sheer stability but by **reconfigurability**—the structural flexibility that allows being to be otherwise than it is. Reconfigurability is not a contingent property but an ontological condition: to exist is to remain open to rearrangement, susceptible to both breakdown and renewal. It defines existence as intrinsically modifiable.

3.2 Possibility of Deviation: Structural Rupture

Reconfigurability becomes actualized through the **possibility of deviation**. Deviation designates the structural possibility of rupture, the opening of a discrepancy that interrupts established patterns of being. It is not accidental but constitutive: deviation names the ever-present potential for displacement that belongs to existence itself. Through deviation, reconfigurability ceases to be latent and enters into operation.

3.3 Reconstructivity: Ontological Renewal

Deviation does not exhaust existence in mere negation; it simultaneously conditions **reconstructivity**. Reconstructivity denotes the ontological capacity to reorganize and to take shape

anew after rupture. It is not restoration of an identical state but the structural possibility of renewal: existence emerges again, configured otherwise, through the very fractures that unsettle it.

3.4 Triadic Dynamic

The three elements—reconfigurability, deviation, reconstructivity—are inseparable moments of a single dynamic. Reconfigurability provides the latent condition of flexibility; deviation discloses rupture as the structural activation of that condition; reconstructivity enacts renewal as its ontological consequence. Taken together, they articulate existence as a triadic cycle of openness, disruption, and renewal. This framework redefines finitude not as a closed limit but as the very site where the possibility of hope is structurally inscribed.

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4. Comparative Philosophy: Persistence, Will, and Power

4.1 Spinoza: *Conatus* and the Persistence of Being

Spinoza's ontology centers on *conatus*, the striving by which each thing endeavors to persist in its being.^7 This concept foregrounds continuity and self-preservation as the essence of existence. While illuminating persistence, *conatus* privileges stability over rupture. From the present standpoint, *conatus* corresponds to **reconfigurability**, yet it lacks systematic accounts of deviation and reconstructivity.

4.2 Schopenhauer: Blind Will and the Negativity of Existence

Schopenhauer radicalized existence as blind, ceaseless will—an incessant striving that generates suffering.^8 His framework recognizes disruption but interprets it only as futility. In terms of the triadic model, Schopenhauer emphasizes **deviation** without reconstructivity: rupture without renewal.

4.3 Nietzsche: Will to Power and the Affirmation of Becoming

Nietzsche's *will to power* affirms becoming as the essence of existence, valorizing transformation and self-overcoming.^9 In terms of the triadic model, Nietzsche approaches **reconstructivity**, but leaves under-theorized the structural conditions of deviation and reconfigurability.

4.4 Comparative Synthesis

- **Spinoza**: persistence without rupture.
- **Schopenhauer**: rupture without renewal.
- **Nietzsche**: renewal without structural grounding.
  The proposed model integrates these fragments into a systematic ontology: reconfigurability (persistence), deviation (rupture), and reconstructivity (renewal) as interrelated moments.

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5. Ethical and Existential Implications — Redefining Hope

5.1 From Affect to Ontology

Hope is commonly treated as an affect, a subjective orientation of expectation or desire. The present framework situates hope ontologically. Hope is not a psychological state but the **structural openness of being to renewal**.^10

5.2 Hope as Structural Reconstructivity

Within the triadic model, hope corresponds to **reconstructivity**. Deviation does not collapse existence into negation; it conditions renewal. Hope names the existential posture that affirms this structural possibility.

5.3 Ethical Orientation

- **Resilience**: attunement to reconfigurability, not optimism.
- **Responsibility**: reconstruction must be oriented, not abandoned to entropy.
- **Community**: reconstruction unfolds within shared worlds; hope is irreducibly communal.

5.4 Toward an Ontology of Hope

Being-toward-death discloses finitude. The triadic model supplements it by disclosing renewal. Existence is finite, yet structurally reconfigurable. Within this interplay lies the **ontology of hope**: not optimism, not affect, but structural openness of finite being to renewal.

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6. Conclusion

The present paper has sought to articulate an ontology of existence beyond the binary of generation and decay. Beginning with the image of the vortex, it argued that existence is marked not by sheer stability but by dynamic processes of rupture and renewal. Heidegger’s account of being-toward-death decisively disclosed finitude but left underdeveloped the structural dynamics of recovery. The proposed framework—**Reconfigurability, Possibility of Deviation, and Reconstructivity**—supplements this account by theorizing existence as intrinsically flexible, disruptible, and renewable.

In comparative perspective, this triadic model integrates what earlier ontologies left partial: Spinoza’s emphasis on persistence, Schopenhauer’s focus on rupture, and Nietzsche’s affirmation of becoming. Each captured an aspect of existence, yet only by articulating their interrelation can one develop a systematic account of disruption and renewal.

The ethical implications of this framework culminate in a redefinition of hope. No longer reducible to affective optimism, hope is here reconceived as the structural openness of finite being to renewal after rupture. Hope thus emerges as ontological rather than psychological: it names the constitutive margin of reconfigurability within which existence persists, deviates, and reconstructs.

In conclusion, finitude remains decisive, but it is not only a limit. It is also the very ground where reconfiguration becomes possible. Existence is always threatened by rupture, yet equally sustained by reconstructivity. Within this tension lies the ontology of hope—a mode of being in which the finite is never mere closure but an opening to renewal.

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Heidegger and the Drive-to-Exist: Universality and Indefinability

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1. Introduction: Universality and Elusiveness

Existence resists simple definition. Philosophy has long sought to determine what it means to exist—whether as permanence, becoming, or dissolution—but each attempt confronts a paradox: the more universal the structure invoked, the less it can be objectified. Being cannot be set before us like an entity, for it constitutes the very horizon within which any entity appears.

This paper introduces the notion of the *drive-to-exist*. The drive-to-exist manifests ubiquitously across domains: in the metabolic persistence of organisms, in the adaptive recalibration of institutions, in the reorientation of meaning after cultural collapse. These diverse phenomena share a common pattern of breakdown and renewal, revealing a structural homology that traverses physical, biological, cognitive, and social life.

Yet precisely because the drive-to-exist is universal, it cannot be defined as a discrete object. To define it would require stepping outside existence itself, a position we never occupy. What we can observe are only its traces—moments of miscalibration, where inherited frames collapse, and acts of re-tuning, where new configurations emerge. In these phenomena, the drive does not appear as a thing but as the very dynamic through which beings persist-through-transformation.

The aim of this paper is therefore not to provide a closed definition but to articulate the ontological status of the drive-to-exist: a universal yet indefinable structure, disclosed through its traces in breakdown and renewal. In doing so, the paper extends Heidegger's account of finitude by supplementing *being-toward-death* with an orientation toward recoverability, and reconceptualizes hope not as affective optimism but as ontological openness—the correlate of the drive itself.

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2. The Drive-to-Exist as a Universal Structure

The *drive-to-exist* can be discerned not in abstract speculation alone but in the recurring dynamics that traverse multiple domains of life. From the self-maintenance of

organisms to the repair of institutions and the reorientation of symbolic worlds, we encounter the same structural pattern: disruption, reconfiguration, and renewal. This recurrence is not accidental. It suggests a universal homology that underlies existence itself.

2.1 Biological Life: Persistence through Rupture

At the biological level, organisms sustain themselves through processes that constantly threaten to undo them. Metabolism exemplifies this: the organism is never in equilibrium but persists through continual breakdown and reconstruction of material components. Similarly, ecological systems maintain resilience not by avoiding disruption but by absorbing and reorganizing after it. In both cases, persistence is inseparable from reconfiguration.

2.2 Cognitive and Affective Life: Re-Tuning of Frames

In human consciousness, the *drive-to-exist* appears as the capacity to recalibrate interpretive frameworks. Experiences of breakdown—such as despair, trauma, or radical doubt—do not simply negate existence but demand re-tuning. Kierkegaard described despair as a sickness unto death that, paradoxically, opens the possibility of renewed relation to self and God. Contemporary cognitive science likewise interprets perception and action as ongoing error-correction: predictive models fail, are revised, and thus sustain viable engagement with the world.

2.3 Social and Institutional Life: Repair and Adaptation

Institutions, too, are marked by breakdown and renewal. Legal systems fractured by crisis—whether through war, colonization, or systemic injustice—often cannot simply restore prior norms. Instead, they reconfigure themselves in novel forms. Scholarship on resilience governance emphasizes precisely this: the persistence of social orders lies not in rigidity but in their adaptive re-tuning after disruption. The drive-to-exist appears here as the structural capacity of institutions to endure by transforming.

2.4 Cultural and Symbolic Life: Renewal after Collapse

At the cultural level, entire symbolic orders can collapse, leaving communities without orientation. Jonathan Lear’s study of the Crow Nation illustrates this poignantly: when traditional ways of life became impossible, the community did not cease to exist but reconstituted its identity through a new horizon of meaning. Such renewal is not mere survival but the creative trace of the drive-to-exist, manifest in symbolic reconfiguration.

2.5 Toward a Universal Homology

These examples are heterogeneous in content but homogeneous in structure. Biological metabolism, cognitive recalibration, institutional repair, and cultural renewal all instantiate the same triadic pattern: breakdown, reconfiguration, and persistence-through-transformation. The *drive-to-exist* thus names not a contingent mechanism but a universal structure that operates wherever existence unfolds.

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3. Why the Drive Cannot Be Defined

The preceding section described the *drive-to-exist* as a universal structure manifested across biological, cognitive, social, and cultural domains. Its traces are evident wherever breakdown and renewal occur. Yet a paradox arises: if the drive-to-exist is everywhere, why can it not be straightforwardly defined?

3.1 Universality and Non-Objectifiability

The very universality of the drive-to-exist prevents its objectification. To define something is to delimit it, to set it before us as an object with boundaries. But the drive-to-exist is not an object among others; it is the structural dynamic that permeates every object and every subject alike. It is coextensive with existence itself. To “stand outside” this structure in order to define it would require a vantage point beyond existence—a standpoint no being occupies.

3.2 Philosophical Parallels

This paradox has precedents in the history of philosophy.

- **Kant** distinguished between empirical objects of experience and the transcendental conditions that make such experience possible. The latter cannot themselves be given as objects; they are knowable only in their function.
- **Heidegger** similarly argued that Being is not a being and cannot be defined as such. It is always already presupposed in our encounter with beings, yet resists objectification.
  The *drive-to-exist* stands in this lineage. It is not a hidden entity waiting to be discovered but a condition that structures the very possibility of persistence and renewal.

3.3 Indefinability as Ontological Proof

To say that the drive-to-exist cannot be defined is not to confess a failure of clarity. On the contrary, its indefinability is evidence of its ontological status. Just as Being cannot be grasped as an object but only disclosed in modes of existence, so too the drive-to-exist is revealed only in its traces—in breakdowns, recalibrations, and renewals. Its universality explains its elusiveness: the more fundamental a structure is, the less it can be detached for observation.

3.4 Methodological Implication

Accordingly, this paper does not seek to offer a closed definition but to articulate the drive-to-exist through phenomenological description of its manifestations. The task is to show how the drive operates implicitly across domains and how its traces illuminate the ontological possibility of hope. Indefinability, then, is not an obstacle but the very mark of its universality.

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4. Traces of the Drive: Breakdown and Re-Tuning

If the *drive-to-exist* cannot be defined directly, it nevertheless reveals itself through its traces. These traces appear in moments of rupture, where existing configurations collapse, and in the work of re-tuning, where new forms of life, meaning, or order are constituted. The drive is not an object to be observed, but a dynamic to be inferred from the recurrence of these phenomena across different domains.

4.1 Scientific Paradigms and Epistemic Rupture

Thomas Kuhn described scientific revolutions as moments in which normal science breaks down under the weight of anomalies, forcing the adoption of a new paradigm. Here, the drive-to-exist is disclosed not as the preservation of knowledge but as its capacity to reorganize after crisis. What persists is not a static body of truth but the community’s ability to recalibrate its epistemic framework.

4.2 Social Institutions and Political Repair

Institutions, too, are marked by breakdown and renewal. Legal systems fractured by crisis—whether through war, colonization, or systemic injustice—often cannot simply restore prior norms. Instead, they reconfigure themselves in novel forms. Scholarship on resilience governance emphasizes precisely this: the persistence of social orders lies

not in rigidity but in their adaptive re-tuning after disruption. The drive-to-exist appears here as the structural capacity of institutions to endure by transforming.

4.3 Cultural Collapse and Symbolic Renewal

Cultures can undergo devastating loss when the symbolic frameworks that orient collective life collapse. Jonathan Lear's study of the Crow Nation illustrates this poignantly: when traditional ways of life became impossible, the community did not cease to exist but reconstituted its identity through a new horizon of meaning. Such renewal is not mere survival but the creative trace of the drive-to-exist, manifest in symbolic reconfiguration.

4.4 Personal Despair and Existential Reorientation

At the level of individual existence, breakdown often takes the form of despair, trauma, or radical loss of orientation. Kierkegaard called despair a "sickness unto death," yet also the condition for authentic renewal in relation to self and God. Contemporary psychology interprets trauma recovery similarly: the subject does not return to an identical state but develops a transformed orientation. Here again, the drive-to-exist is visible only in its trace—the re-tuning of life after breakdown.

4.5 The Ontological Pattern of Traces

Across science, institutions, culture, and individual existence, a common pattern emerges:

1. Breakdown of inherited frames (*miscalibration*),
2. Re-tuning or reconfiguration,
3. Persistence-through-transformation.

These are not merely analogous processes but expressions of a universal ontological structure. The *drive-to-exist* discloses itself not in definitional clarity but in the recurrence of this pattern—the traces through which existence reveals its own capacity for renewal.

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5. Hope as Ontological Openness

If the *drive-to-exist* is a universal but indefinable structure disclosed through its traces, then its existential correlate is *hope*. Hope is often conceived as a subjective affect—an

optimistic expectation or a motivational state. Yet such notions remain contingent and psychological. What emerges from the foregoing analysis is a more fundamental sense of hope: not a mood among others, but the ontological openness by which existence sustains itself through breakdown and renewal.

5.1 Beyond Optimism: Hope as Structural Orientation

Optimism projects favorable outcomes; hope, in the sense articulated here, is not tied to probability. It is the stance that acknowledges breakdown as unavoidable yet affirms the possibility of reconfiguration. Hope is thus not reducible to desire for specific futures but names the openness of existence itself—the capacity of the drive-to-exist to sustain transformation.

5.2 Dialogues with Philosophical Accounts of Hope

This structural interpretation resonates with, yet exceeds, earlier philosophies of hope:

- **Ernst Bloch** spoke of the *Not-Yet*, the anticipatory openness of being. The drive-to-exist clarifies this as the structural persistence of renewal itself.
- **Gabriel Marcel** conceived hope as fidelity and trust. Here, fidelity appears not merely ethical but ontological: the trust that existence itself can re-tune.
- **Paul Ricoeur** emphasized surplus of capability. The drive-to-exist grounds this surplus as an ontological condition rather than a merely human trait.
- **Jonathan Lear** described radical hope as the capacity of a culture to reorient after collapse. The drive-to-exist generalizes this: every collapse harbors the trace of renewal.

These accounts point toward hope as more than emotion, but they remain partial. The ontology of the drive-to-exist provides a framework that unifies them within a universal structure of persistence-through-transformation.

5.3 Hope as the Phenomenological Correlate of the Drive

If the drive-to-exist is the structural condition, hope is its phenomenological correlate. Hope is how existence is lived when the possibility of re-tuning is affirmed. In despair, the drive remains operative but concealed; in hope, it becomes disclosed as openness to renewal. Hope thus names not the guarantee of outcomes but the disclosure of existence’s own recoverability.

5.4 Ethical and Social Implications

Reconceiving hope as ontological openness shifts its ethical significance. It calls for practices and institutions that do not merely preserve stability but cultivate resilience—the capacity to reorganize after rupture. In ecological ethics, this translates into designing systems that anticipate breakdown and sustain renewal. In political life, it implies institutions flexible enough to adapt without collapse. Hope, in this sense, is not naïve consolation but the ontological condition for collective endurance.

5.5 Toward an Ontology of Hope

What this chapter has articulated is not a new psychology of hope but its ontological grounding. Hope is coextensive with the drive-to-exist: it is the lived disclosure of existence's universal but indefinable structure. To hope is to stand within the openness of renewal, to trust that breakdown is not the end of existence but its very mode of persistence.

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6. Conclusion: Indefinability as Ontological Proof

This paper has argued that the *drive-to-exist* is a universal yet indefinable structure. It manifests not as a discrete object but as the dynamic through which beings persist by transforming. Its traces are visible across domains—in biological metabolism, in cognitive recalibration, in institutional repair, and in cultural renewal. Each reveals the same ontological pattern: breakdown, re-tuning, and persistence-through-transformation.

The very universality of this structure explains its resistance to definition. To define something is to delimit it as an object; but the drive-to-exist is coextensive with existence itself. Like Kant's transcendental conditions or Heidegger's Being, it cannot be objectified without distortion. Its indefinability is not a weakness but the mark of its ontological status. We grasp it not by stepping outside existence, but by tracing its operation in the phenomena of rupture and renewal.

Within this framework, *hope* emerges as the phenomenological correlate of the drive-to-exist. Hope is not optimism about outcomes but the lived disclosure of existence's openness to reconfiguration. It affirms that breakdown does not exhaust existence but reveals its capacity for renewal. To hope is to stand within the drive itself: to inhabit the indefinable universality that sustains life, thought, and community through transformation.

The contribution of this paper is twofold. Philosophically, it extends Heidegger's analysis of finitude by supplementing *being-toward-death* with an orientation toward recoverability. Conceptually, it redefines hope as ontological openness, grounded not in psychology or theology but in the universal structure of existence.

Future work must explore the implications of this ontology of hope for concrete practices—ecological resilience, institutional design, cultural repair. Yet the guiding insight remains: the *drive-to-exist* is both universal and indefinable, and precisely in this lies its ontological force. Its traces remind us that to exist is never mere continuity or sheer negation, but persistence-through-renewal.

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From Finitude to Hope: Reconfigurability and the Drive-to-Exist in Heideggerian Ontology

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Abstract

This paper reconfigures Heideggerian ontology by supplementing *being-toward-death* with a structural and processual account of recoverability. Philosophical traditions have long privileged one pole of existence—generation over decay, affirmation over negation—while neglecting the unstable dynamics in between. Heidegger's *Being and Time* rigorously disclosed finitude through mortality, yet left insufficiently articulated how beings reorganize once breakdown occurs.

To address this lacuna, the paper develops a dual framework. Structurally, existence is constituted by **reconfigurability** (latent flexibility), **deviation** (rupture), and **reconstructivity** (renewal). Processually, this triad unfolds through the **drive-to-exist**: the capacity of beings to sustain and re-tune their organization when symbolic, temporal, or material frames collapse. Across physical, biological, cognitive, and social domains, persistence occurs not by resisting disruption but through transformation under instability.

The ethical and existential implications culminate in a redefinition of **hope**. No longer reducible to affective optimism, hope is reconceived as the ontological openness of finite being to renewal after rupture. By integrating structural clarity with processual dynamics, the paper offers a systematic ontology of recoverability, repositioning finitude not as mere closure but as the constitutive ground of hope.

Keywords

Heidegger; ontology; finitude; reconfigurability; deviation; reconstructivity; drive-to-exist; breakdown and re-tuning; recoverability; hope

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Introduction

Existence is always suspended between **generation** and **decay**. Throughout the history of philosophy, one pole has often been privileged over the other: generation is valorized

as positive, decay relegated as negative. Yet existence is neither equilibrium nor stasis; it unfolds in the oscillation between rupture and recovery. The task of this paper is to reconceptualize this "between" as a distinct ontological dimension.

To this end, I first articulate a **structural triad**: **Reconfigurability**, the latent flexibility of being; **Deviation**, the inherent possibility of rupture; and **Reconstructivity**, the renewal of form after breakdown. This framework highlights the dimension of recoverability absent from traditional dualisms. Finitude is no longer merely a closed limit but the very ground of possibility—where hope becomes ontologically inscribed.

Yet a purely structural account remains insufficient. Existence is in practice compelled to recalibrate whenever temporal, symbolic, or social frames collapse. Such moments of **miscalibration** expose fragility, but they also generate the conditions for new forms of organization. I therefore introduce the concept of the **drive-to-exist**: the dynamic capacity of beings to persist *through transformation*. Existence endures not by resisting disruption but by re-tuning itself in and through breakdown. What sustains this dynamic is **hope**, redefined here not as affective optimism but as the ontological openness that affirms recoverability within finitude.

The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, it offers a **structural ontology** in which existence is defined by the interplay of reconfigurability, deviation, and reconstructivity. Second, it develops a **processual ontology** of the drive-to-exist, situating breakdown and re-tuning as central to persistence and extending the framework across biological, cognitive, and social domains. Taken together, these models reconfigure finitude: not as closure, but as the constitutive site where renewal becomes possible.

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2. Revisiting Heidegger

2.1 Being-toward-Death in *Being and Time*

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger defined Dasein as essentially finite, disclosed through its orientation toward death (*Sein-zum-Tode*). Death, as Dasein's *ownmost possibility*, functions as the horizon within which existence appropriates itself. This intervention decisively shifted ontology away from biological persistence toward a recognition of finitude as the constitutive structure of being. Heidegger's analysis remains one of the most rigorous accounts of mortality in modern philosophy.

Yet its emphasis is asymmetrical. By privileging death as the terminal rupture, Heidegger foregrounded the disclosure of finitude but left underdeveloped the dynamics of how beings reorganize once breakdown occurs. Mortality reveals the ultimate limit, but the processes of recalibration—how existence reconstitutes itself after ruptures of meaning, time, or relation—are insufficiently articulated.

2.2 Later Heidegger: *Ereignis* and *Gelassenheit*

In his later thought, Heidegger introduced *Ereignis* (event of appropriation) and *Gelassenheit* (releasement) as attempts to move beyond a purely death-centered ontology. *Ereignis* gestures toward the event-character of being itself, while *Gelassenheit* emphasizes an attitude of letting-be. Both extend the horizon of openness beyond the earlier focus on mortality.

Nevertheless, these concepts stop short of a systematic account of recoverability. *Ereignis* names the happening of being but does not clarify how concrete breakdowns generate new configurations. *Gelassenheit* describes a receptive disposition but leaves unexplained the mechanisms by which releasement becomes re-tuning. In both cases, openness is evoked, yet the interplay of rupture and renewal remains obscure.

2.3 Toward a Reconfiguration

It is in this lacuna that the present framework intervenes. Existence may be understood not only as finite, but also as structurally flexible (*reconfigurability*), inherently disruptible (*deviation*), and capable of renewal (*reconstructivity*). This triadic framework supplements *being-toward-death* by showing that finitude is not only a limit but the very ground where recoverability becomes possible.

Here the concept of the **drive-to-exist** provides the processual complement. While Heidegger discloses death as the horizon of existence, the drive-to-exist discloses the capacity to re-tune in the face of breakdown. It articulates how beings inhabit instability, reorganizing temporal, symbolic, and social frames when inherited structures collapse. In this way, the drive-to-exist reframes finitude as both limitation and resource: the condition that makes renewal structurally inscribed in being.

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3. Reconfigurability, Deviation, and Reconstructivity

3.1 Reconfigurability: Structural Flexibility

Existence is not defined by sheer stability but by **reconfigurability**—the structural flexibility that allows beings to be otherwise than they currently are. To exist is to remain open to rearrangement, susceptible to both rupture and renewal. This flexibility is not accidental but ontological: it constitutes the condition of possibility for transformation.

In dynamic terms, reconfigurability becomes evident whenever established symbolic, temporal, or relational frames begin to fray. Far from equilibrium, existence maintains itself not through static endurance but through the readiness to recalibrate. Reconfigurability thus names the latent openness upon which every subsequent deviation and re-tuning depends.

3.2 Deviation: Structural Rupture

Reconfigurability is activated through **deviation**—the structural possibility of rupture. Deviation designates the disruption of inherited frames, exposing the contingency of order. It is not a mere accident but a constitutive feature of existence: every being harbors the potential to break from its established patterns.

Miscalibration provides a concrete form of deviation. Temporal incommensurabilities, symbolic fractures, and failures of recognition destabilize the coherence of shared worlds. Such breakdowns interrupt habitual organization, but they also disclose the structural fragility that makes transformation possible. Deviation is therefore not reducible to negation; it is the very moment in which flexibility enters into operation.

3.3 Reconstructivity: Ontological Renewal

From rupture arises **reconstructivity**, the capacity of existence to reorganize and take shape anew. Reconstructivity is not a return to a prior equilibrium but the emergence of new configurations through breakdown. Renewal is thus structurally inscribed in finitude itself: existence is finite, yet capable of self-reconstitution.

Here the processual lens of the **drive-to-exist** becomes salient. When frames collapse, beings re-tune—recalibrating horizons of action, renegotiating symbolic references, repairing relations of recognition. These practices instantiate reconstructivity as lived

persistence-through-transformation. What sustains this process is **hope**, the ontological openness that affirms renewal even when stability cannot be guaranteed.

3.4 Triadic Dynamic

Taken together, the three moments form an inseparable cycle:

- **Reconfigurability** provides latent openness.
- **Deviation** activates rupture as the structural disclosure of fragility.
- **Reconstructivity** enacts renewal, allowing existence to persist through transformation.

This triadic dynamic integrates structure with process. It shows that finitude is not merely a limit but the constitutive site where breakdown and re-tuning are woven into the very texture of being. Existence is always threatened by rupture, yet equally sustained by reconstructivity. Within this tension lies the ontology of hope.

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4. Comparative Philosophy and Intellectual Lineages

4.1 Spinoza: Persistence without Rupture

Spinoza's ontology centers on *conatus*—the striving by which each thing endeavors to persist in its being. This emphasis on continuity illuminates existence as essentially self-preserving. Yet from the present standpoint, *conatus* corresponds only to **reconfigurability**, the latent capacity to endure, while leaving under-theorized the dynamics of rupture and renewal. Spinoza provides persistence, but not deviation or reconstructivity.

4.2 Schopenhauer: Rupture without Renewal

Schopenhauer radicalized existence as blind will (*Wille*), an incessant striving that generates suffering. In terms of the triadic model, this captures **deviation** without **reconstructivity**: rupture is foregrounded, but renewal is denied. Existence appears as compulsion into futility, with no structural account of recovery. Schopenhauer thus articulates disruption but forecloses the possibility of hope.

4.3 Nietzsche: Renewal without Structural Grounding

Nietzsche's *will to power* affirms becoming as the essence of existence. Transformation and self-overcoming are valorized, aligning closely with **reconstructivity**. Yet Nietzsche leaves implicit the conditions of deviation and the structural flexibility that enable renewal. The result is an affirmation of becoming without an ontological grounding for the mechanisms of rupture and re-tuning.

4.4 Comparative Synthesis of the Triadic Model

From this perspective:

- Spinoza emphasizes persistence without rupture.
- Schopenhauer emphasizes rupture without renewal.
- Nietzsche emphasizes renewal without structural grounding.

The proposed triadic ontology integrates these fragments into a systematic account: **reconfigurability (persistence), deviation (rupture), and reconstructivity (renewal)** as interrelated and inseparable moments.

4.5 Kierkegaard: Despair and the Openness of Hope

Kierkegaard illuminates the existential stakes of finitude by analyzing despair as the refusal of openness to the infinite. From the present framework, despair represents a collapse of reconstructivity into paralysis. Hope, in contrast, sustains existence in its readiness to inhabit uncertainty. Kierkegaard thus provides an existential correlate to the triadic dynamic, situating hope as the condition of renewal within finitude.

4.6 Bloch and Marcel: Hope as Ontological Surplus

Ernst Bloch's *Principle of Hope* conceived hope as orientation toward the "Not-Yet," an ontological surplus irreducible to present actuality. Gabriel Marcel described hope as fidelity, a being-in-hope grounded in trust rather than calculation. Both accounts resonate with **reconstructivity**: they portray hope not as affect but as structural openness to renewal beyond given frames.

4.7 Ricoeur and Lear: Capability and Radical Hope

Paul Ricoeur emphasized the *surplus of capability*—humans as always capable of more than actualized roles. Jonathan Lear, analyzing cultural devastation, argued that hope sustains meaning precisely when inherited frameworks collapse. Both perspectives align with the **drive-to-exist**: the capacity to re-tune symbolic and social worlds under breakdown. Hope, here, is inseparable from the practice of reconstructivity.

4.8 Integrative Lineage

Bringing these threads together, the structural triad clarifies the partial insights of classical ontology, while the processual account of the drive-to-exist integrates modern philosophies of hope. The result is a lineage that moves:

- from persistence (Spinoza)
- through rupture (Schopenhauer)
- to renewal (Nietzsche),
- supplemented by existential accounts of despair and faith (Kierkegaard),
- by surplus and fidelity (Bloch, Marcel),
- and by capability and radical hope (Ricoeur, Lear).

This comparative synthesis shows that the ontology of recoverability both systematizes what earlier philosophies treated in isolation and extends their insights into a structural and processual account of hope.

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5. Ethical and Existential Implications — Redefining Hope

5.1 From Affect to Ontology

Hope is often treated as a psychological affect, reducible to optimism or expectation. The present framework redefines hope ontologically: not as a subjective mood but as the **structural openness of finite existence to renewal**. Hope is thus not predicated on probability or prediction, but on the possibility of reconstructivity within finitude.

5.2 Hope as Structural Reconstructivity

Within the triadic model, hope corresponds to **reconstructivity**—the capacity of existence to reorganize itself after rupture. Deviation does not collapse beings into negation; rather, it discloses the ground of renewal. To live in hope is to inhabit this structural possibility: to affirm that breakdown can be generative rather than terminal.

5.3 Ethical Orientation

The ontology of recoverability yields a threefold ethical orientation:

- **Resilience**: attunement to reconfigurability, sustaining openness rather than clinging to optimism.
- **Responsibility**: re-tuning and reconstruction must be directed, not left to entropy or compulsion.
- **Community**: renewal unfolds within shared worlds; hope is irreducibly intersubjective.

Hope thereby grounds a relational ethic: to sustain the possibility of reconfiguration not only for oneself but within the horizons of others.

5.4 Collective Hope and Institutional Re-tuning

Hope acquires its most concrete force at the collective level. Communities are sustained by symbolic and temporal frames that are always fragile. When these frames collapse—whether through ecological disruption, institutional crisis, or epistemic breakdown—recoverability depends on collective re-tuning.

- **Temporal re-tuning**: negotiating mismatched horizons (short-term urgency vs. long-term sustainability).
- **Symbolic re-tuning**: reconstructing shared references when inherited categories lose legitimacy.
- **Recognition repair**: sustaining the capacity to remain in dialogue even amid conflict.

Collective hope can thus be defined as the distributed capacity to renegotiate frames of meaning and action under conditions of instability.

5.5 Practical and Normative Implications

This reconceptualization of hope carries practical stakes:

- **Ecological governance**: sustaining adaptive responses across mismatched temporal scales.
- **Institutional repair**: recalibrating norms and practices when predictive models fail.
- **Epistemic humility**: cultivating openness to breakdown, treating disruption not as anomaly but as generative condition.

Ethically, to act with hope is to remain committed to processes of re-tuning rather than foreclosing futures. Institutions, discourses, and collective practices must therefore be designed not for permanence but for recoverability.

5.6 Toward an Ontology of Hope

Being-toward-death discloses finitude as limit. The triadic framework supplements this by disclosing renewal, while the drive-to-exist articulates how beings re-tune in practice. Hope, reconceived as ontological openness, names the posture that sustains recoverability within finitude. It is not optimism, not a prediction of success, but the structural condition that enables transformation after collapse.

In this sense, hope is both ethical and existential:

- **Ethical**, because it orients responsibility toward renewal with others.
- **Existential**, because it sustains meaning where inherited frames dissolve.

The ontology of hope thus positions finitude not as mere closure but as the very site where resilience, responsibility, and community are made possible.

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6. Conclusion: Toward an Ontology of Hope

This paper has sought to reconfigure Heideggerian ontology by supplementing *being-toward-death* with a structural and processual account of recoverability. Philosophy has long reduced existence to binaries—generation versus decay, affirmation versus

negation—while neglecting the unstable dynamics between them. Heidegger decisively disclosed finitude through mortality, but left underdeveloped the structural and practical dynamics of recovery.

The proposed framework addressed this lacuna in two steps. Structurally, existence was articulated through the triad of **reconfigurability**, **deviation**, and **reconstructivity**. These moments clarify that finitude is not a mere limit but the very site where openness to renewal is ontologically inscribed. Processually, the concept of the **drive-to-exist** showed how beings recalibrate under breakdown: miscalibration exposes fragility, re-tuning reorganizes frames, and hope sustains openness throughout this dynamic.

Comparative analysis demonstrated how classical philosophies offered partial insights —Spinoza's persistence, Schopenhauer's rupture, Nietzsche's renewal—while existential and modern accounts of hope (Kierkegaard, Bloch, Marcel, Ricoeur, Lear) supplemented these fragments with accounts of despair, fidelity, capability, and radical transformation. The integrated framework situates these contributions within a systematic ontology of recoverability.

The ethical and existential implications culminate in a redefinition of **hope**. No longer reducible to optimism or affect, hope emerges as the structural openness of finite being to renewal. Ethically, it grounds resilience, responsibility, and community. Existentially, it sustains meaning when inherited worlds collapse. Ontologically, it shows that breakdown is not accidental disturbance but constitutive condition.

In conclusion, finitude remains decisive, but it is not only a horizon of death. It is also the ground where disruption and renewal are woven together. To exist is not merely to persist but to remain open to reconfiguration. The **drive-to-exist** expresses this structural capacity; **hope** sustains the orientation toward unrealized possibilities. Together they disclose an ontology in which the finite is never mere closure but an opening to transformation.

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